Sent: Wednesday, February 24, 2010 11:32 AM
Subject: School Food Safety Program Based on Hazard Analysis and Critical Control Point Principles (HACCP); Approval of Information Collection Request
[Federal Register: February 24, 2010 (Volume 75, Number 36)]
[Rules and Regulations]
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DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE
Food and Nutrition Service
7 CFR Parts 210 and 220
School Food Safety Program Based on Hazard Analysis and Critical
Control Point Principles (HACCP); Approval of Information Collection
AGENCY: Food and Nutrition Service, USDA.
ACTION: Final rule; approval of information collection request.
SUMMARY: The final rule entitled School Food Safety Program Based on Hazard Analysis and Critical Control Point Principles (HACCP) was published on December 15, 2009, which implemented a legislative provision requiring school food authorities participating in the National School Lunch Program (NSLP) or the School Breakfast Program (SBP) to develop a school food safety program for the preparation and service of school meals served to children. The Office of Management and Budget (OMB) cleared the associated information collection requirements (ICR) on November 2, 2009. This document announces approval of the ICR.
DATES: The ICR associated with the final rule published in the Federal Register on December 15, 2009, at 74 FR 66213, was approved by OMB on December 30, 2009, under OMB Control Number 0584-0550.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Lynn Rodgers-Kuperman, Chief, Program Analysis and Monitoring Branch, Child Nutrition Division, Food and Nutrition Service, USDA, 3101 Park Center Drive, Room 640, Alexandria, Virginia 22302, (703) 305-2600, or Lynn.Rogers@fns.usda.gov.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: The December 15, 2009 (74 FR 66213), final rule implemented a legislative provision which requires school food authorities participating in the National School Lunch Program (NSLP) or the School Breakfast Program (SBP) to develop a school food safety program for the preparation and service of school meals served to children. The school food safety program must be based on the (HACCP) system established by the Secretary of Agriculture. The food safety program enables schools to take systematic action to prevent or minimize the risk of food-borne illness among children participating in the NSLP and SBP. The information collection requirements were approved by OMB on December 30, 2009.
Dated: February 4, 2010.
Administrator, Food and Nutrition Service.
[FR Doc. 2010-3476 Filed 2-23-10; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 3410-30-P
Foodborne Disease Outbreaks in United States Schools: Discussion
Between 1973 and 1997, >600 foodborne disease outbreaks in schools were reported to CDC. These outbreaks resulted in nearly 50 000 illnesses, >1500 hospitalizations and 1 death. This represents ~5% of all foodborne disease outbreaks and 12% of all outbreak-associated cases reported to CDC. The three most commonly identified etiologic agents were Salmonella, S. aureus and C. perfringens. The percentage of outbreaks of known etiology due to Salmonella serotype Enteritidis increased over the surveillance period, whereas the percentage caused by S. aureus decreased. Other notable trends include an 8-fold decrease in the percentage of outbreaks due to turkey, a 3-fold increase in outbreaks linked to salads and a decline in the number of milk-associated outbreaks. Whether these changes reflect variation in the relative safety of these items, a change in dietary habits or both cannot be determined with certainty from these data. Nevertheless some of the changes may be attributed to fewer tours of milk dairies and raw milk tastings and a large increase in the number of salads consumed.
The majority of outbreaks with known vehicles were caused by foods prepared on school premises. Therefore prevention efforts should focus on school-based interventions. Practices identified as contributing to outbreaks in schools include improper refrigeration, prolonged handling and inadequate reheating of cooked foods. Following established food safety guidelines on food preparation, handling, storage and service can greatly reduce the risk of foodborne disease outbreaks.[13-15] All meat and poultry should be thoroughly cooked, cooked foods not used immediately should be rapidly chilled to refrigeration temperature (<40°f)>160°F), that the temperature of egg-containing products be carefully monitored and that devices used to mix or prepare raw eggs be regularly disassembled, cleaned and sanitized. Pasteurized eggs should be used for all meals requiring large quantities of pooled eggs and are the best choice for all recipes containing eggs.
Several outbreaks in schools have been attributed to contamination of food by food-handlers who worked while ill[6, 11] or had poor personal hygiene.[17, 18] In our review of reported foodborne outbreaks in school, 57% of outbreaks were attributed to likely contamination by a food-handler. The adoption of a work policy that includes paid leave for food handlers with gastroenteritis would probably increase compliance with illness-related work exclusion policies. Training and certifying all food handlers in school cafeterias in specific techniques, such as good personal hygiene, adequate hand washing, proper cooling and reheating of foods and methods of preventing cross-contamination between cooked and raw foods, would also likely reduce the incidence of foodborne disease outbreaks.
In addition to promoting proper food handling and hygiene practices among school employees, it is important that schools purchase foodstuffs that have been produced safely. Purchase contracts for meat, poultry and eggs often have not stipulated food safety criteria. Requiring such foods to be produced under Hazard Analysis and Critical Control Point (HACCP) or egg quality assurance plans that meet microbiologic performance requirements would be an important addition to school food safety. During school year 2000 the US Department of Agriculture (USDA), which annually purchases >100 million pounds of beef products for the National School Lunch Program and other federal food and nutrition programs, began requiring that ground beef purchased through the program test negative for both E. coli O157:H7 and Salmonella. However, USDA directly provides only a small percentage of food served in schools. School food authorities purchase 83% of the food served in school lunch programs and all of the food served in school breakfast programs. Additional efforts to assure the purchase of safe food stuffs may be an important step, although the extent to which this would increase the risk of foodborne outbreaks in schools is not clear. Recent US declines in Salmonella and Campylobacter are credited to the mandated HACCP rule for meat and poultry. The changes in incidence of foodborne infections have occurred in the context of the introduction of the HACCP regulations for meat and poultry in processing plants, increased attention to egg and fresh produce safety, industry efforts, food safety education, increased regulation of imported food and other prevention measures.
The risk of outbreaks caused by bacterial and parasitic pathogens could be further reduced through the broader application of irradiation pasteurization of solid foods using low-dose gamma rays, radiographs or electron beams.[23-25] Although widespread use of this technology has been hampered by the perception of consumer concerns, the use of irradiation to pasteurize food has been endorsed by the World Health Organization, the US Department of Health and Human Services, the USDA, the American Medical Association and the American Public Health Association.[26-29] Irradiation pasteurization of meat and poultry used in schools would be an important further step in reducing outbreaks caused by to bacterial pathogens such as E. coli O157:H7 and Salmonella. Because viral foodborne pathogens such as hepatitis A and Norwalk-like viruses are more radioresistant, irradiation pasteurization is less likely to prevent outbreaks due to these pathogens.
The limitations of our report should be recognized. The number of foodborne outbreaks reported by this passive surveillance system represents only a small proportion of those that occur. Foodborne outbreaks caused by an etiologic agent with a short incubation period (e.g. bacterial toxins) are more likely to be recognized as common source outbreaks than are diseases with longer incubation periods (e.g. hepatitis A). Furthermore our report likely underestimates the proportion of viral gastroenteritis outbreaks in schools, because stool and serum testing of specimens for viral pathogens (e.g. Norwalk-like viruses) is not widely available, making confirmation of these outbreaks more difficult. Outbreaks caused by organisms that are not routinely screened for by laboratories or that require special media for detection, such as E. coli O157:H7, Norwalk-like viruses, Vibrio species, Yersinia, C. perfringens and Campylobacter may be underrepresented. In addition testing of some organisms (e.g. E. coli O157:H7, Norwalk-like viruses, enzyme immunoassay for Giardia and toxin testing) became available during the course of the time period covered in this review. Information on the size and other characteristics of affected schools was not available. Other limitations include lack of information about how factors contributing to outbreak were determined and lack of information on the specific school setting (e.g. elementary school, high school or university). A recently published primer directed to primary care physicians, who are more likely to see the index case of a potential food-related disease outbreak, is a teaching tool for primary care physicians about foodborne illness and to remind them of their important role in recognizing suspicious symptoms, disease clusters and etiologic agents and reporting cases of foodborne illness to public health authorities.
Relative to the number of meals served in America's schools, the number of reported outbreaks of foodborne illness may appear relatively small. Nevertheless the cumulative disease burden on this vulnerable population is considerable. Adequate training of school staff and the integration of food safety criteria into purchase contracts are measures that can be immediately employed to reduce the burden of foodborne disease among school children. Investigations of foodborne disease outbreaks in schools and continued outbreak surveillance are needed to identify trends in disease frequency, to detect the emergence of new causes of foodborne illness and to ensure the highest standards of food safety for school children in America.
Foodborne disease websites: www.cdc.gov/foodnet, http://www.foodsafety.gov/, http://www.cfsan.fda.gov/,
Q: You've been very vocal about your belief that HACCP [Hazard Analysis and Critical Control Points] systems employed by the meat industry are 'a hoax.' If you were writing the meat safety rules, what would they look like?
A: Number one, HACCP was advertised as being science-based, and it is not. HACCP was designed by Pillsbury 20-30 years ago. They were making fully-cooked, ready-to-eat food for the astronaut program and it had to be guaranteed safe. Well, those were highly-processed, fully-cooked ready-to-eat-foods--the pathogens would be cooked out--they all had a real "kill step."
Well, the USDA saw the HACCP program and thought, 'Gee, that sounds really good. Lets apply that meat inspection.' The problem is the vast majority of what we process in meat plants is not fully-cooked, ready-to-eat, it is raw.
The USDA shouldn't use the term HACCP unless the products they are working with are fully cooked.
Number two, when the agency required the industry to implement HACCP, the agency said that under the program the USDA's role would be hands-off. That is an absolute disaster.
The USDA cannot be hands-off.
Under the transition to HACCP, the USDA knowingly acquiesced its authority back to the industry. It's an absolute disaster waiting to happen.
The natural long-term consequences of the agency adopting a hands-off, non-involvement role is ongoing outbreaks and recurring recalls all the time now.
HACCP cannot work in the raw meat industry.
I really think that meat inspection should be moved from the USDA, and that a separate agency should be created to perform inspection of not only meat and poultry but also produce, which is currently assigned to the FDA.
A: I say it's embarassing, because it should be embarassing to the USDA that, in spite of their "science-based" meat inspection program we have all these ongoing outbreaks and recalls. It should also be embarrassing to our industry.
It's been 11 year since the biggest packers implemented the HACCP program. You'd think that by this point the program would be maturing and paying dividends, but in fact it's going the opposite direction.
We've got to finally realize that the consuming pubic are going to see through this--this façade. At times I wonder if the word "embarrassing" is not the right word. The overarching, more important concern is food safety and sick consumers and people who are dying.
People are dying. A lot of people are getting sick, this should be an embarrassment to this industry, and to the USDA.
Subject: Food Safety and Inspection Service Assessment of the Equivalence of the Canadian Inspection System Report No: 24601-05-HY OIG
Date: January 12, 2006 at 7:22 am PST
Food Safety and Inspection Service
Assessment of the Equivalence of the
Canadian Inspection System
Report No. 24601-05-Hy December 2005
Food Safety and Inspection Service Assessment of the Equivalence of the Canadian Inspection System (Audit Report No. 24601-05-Hy)
Results in Brief We evaluated the Food Safety and Inspection Service’s (FSIS) assessment of the equivalence of the Canadian inspection system for meat and poultry products. In a November 6, 2003, memorandum, the FSIS Administrator and the Under Secretary for Food Safety identified serious concerns with the Canadian inspection system. They noted in the memorandum that these concerns had the potential for compromising public health. We found FSIS did not timely address these serious concerns. For example, in July 2003, FSIS identified that Canadian inspection officials were not enforcing certain pathogen reduction and Hazard Analysis and Critical Control Point (HACCP) system regulations. These same types of concerns were identified again in June 2005, almost 2 years later.
Timely actions were not taken because FSIS does not have protocols or guidelines for evaluating deficiencies in a country’s inspection system that could jeopardize a country’s overall equivalence determination. In addition, FSIS did not institute compensating controls (e.g., increased port-of-entry testing) to ensure that public health was not compromised while deficiencies were present. Over 4.4 billion pounds of Canadian processed product entered U.S. commerce from January 1, 2003 through May 31, 2005. In FSIS’ information system, the products were categorized as cuts and trimmings of raw product as well as products with additional processing from pork, veal, beef, poultry, and lamb. These products were produced and allowed to be exported to the United States even though FSIS officials questioned the equivalence of the Canadian inspection system.
FSIS regulations1 require foreign inspection systems to provide standards equivalent to those of the United States. These requirements include the implementation of sanitation controls and HACCP requirements. Sanitation controls cover all aspects of facility and equipment sanitation, the prevention of actual or potential instances of product cross-contamination, good personal hygiene practices, and good product handling and storage practices. All plants must develop, adopt, and implement a HACCP plan for each of their processes. Under HACCP, plants identify critical control points during their processes where hazards such as microbial contamination can occur, establish controls to prevent or reduce those hazards, and maintain records documenting that controls are working as intended.
In July 2003, as part of an onsite review, FSIS identified serious concerns with the Canadian inspection system. These concerns included the
1 Title 9, Code of Federal Regulations (C.F.R.) § 327.2 (a) (2) and 9 C.F.R. § 381.196 (a) (2), January 1, 2005 edition.
USDA/OIG-Audit No. 24601-05-Hy Page ii
insufficient implementation of sanitation controls and HACCP requirements by establishments and the lack of enforcement in these areas by Canadian inspection officials. Based on these concerns, FSIS proposed an enforcement review in 2004. (Enforcement reviews can lead to a determination that a country’s system is not equivalent to U.S. standards and, thus, not eligible to export to the United States). The proposed 2004 enforcement review was not conducted and FSIS officials did not reassess Canada’s implementation and enforcement of sanitation controls and HAACP requirements until almost 2 years later. When FSIS officials finally returned to Canada in May 2005, they continued to find the same types of deficiencies they had found in 2003. FSIS should analyze the deficiencies identified in the 2003 and 2005 reviews to determine whether immediate actions are needed to address concerns regarding public health and if additional enforcement measures are needed.
FSIS’ analysis of the regulations governing the Canadian inspection system identified two areas which may not be equivalent to the United States inspection system. FSIS found that Canadian policy allowed less than daily inspection coverage in processing establishments. By contrast, FSIS has a long established history of requiring the presence of an inspector in a U.S. processing establishment at least once per shift per day. FSIS also identified differences in the testing performed for Listeria monocytogenes. Canadian inspection officials require establishments to perform risk-based environmental sampling, as opposed to the finished product sampling required by FSIS.
In a management alert to the FSIS Administrator in July 2005, we reported that FSIS had not taken timely action to resolve the agency’s June 2003 finding that Canada does not require daily inspection coverage at processing establishments that export product to the United States. In addition, FSIS’ actions regarding Canadian processing establishments were not consistent with how the agency treated similarly situated countries. When FSIS identified less than daily inspection in establishments in Australia in June 2004, and in Belgium in July 2003, the establishments were immediately delisted and no longer allowed to export product to the United States. According to FSIS officials, Australia and Belgium did not pursue an equivalence determination, which was pursued by Canada. In response to our recommendations, FSIS agreed to initiate a number of actions to ensure that an equivalence determination was made regarding daily inspection coverage. However, FSIS asserted that a final decision could not be made until 2007. In the interim, FSIS agreed to implement measures that the agency believes will ensure there is no increased risk to the public health in the United States. These measures included doubling the sampling of Canadian shipments and increasing the presence of Canadian inspection officials in processing establishments exporting to the United States.
USDA/OIG-Audit No. 24601-05-Hy Page iii
In Brief FSIS needs to develop and implement protocols for postponing or canceling a scheduled enforcement review and for determining which equivalence deficiencies would call into question a country’s overall equivalence to U.S. standards. In addition, FSIS should analyze the deficiencies identified in the 2003 and 2005 reviews of the Canadian inspection system to determine whether additional actions are needed to address concerns regarding public health. Finally, FSIS needs to develop an action plan for determining whether the Canadian inspection system control for Listeria monocytogenes in ready-to-eat products is equivalent to that of the United States.
FSIS agreed with the report’s recommendations. We have incorporated the agency’s response in the Findings and Recommendations section of this report, along with the OIG position. The response is included as Exhibit A.
Based on the response, we were able to reach management decision on the report’s five recommendations.
however, these reviews did not focus on the differences identified in 2003. These two reviews primarily evaluated the implementation of FSIS’ requirements related to BSE. In December 2004, FSIS officials performed a review of 15 Canadian establishments that slaughtered cattle and calves for export to the United States. This review found that Canadian establishments implemented FSIS’ requirements for BSE and controlled the use of hormone implants in calves. In February 2005, FSIS officials visited two Canadian beef slaughter establishments and three establishments that processed this product. This review found that
USDA/OIG-Audit No. 24601-05-Hy Page 8
7 Specified risk materials are prohibited from use for human food. The materials include the brain, skull, eyes, trigeminal ganglia, spinal cord, vertebral column (excluding the vertebrae of the tail, the traverse processes of the thoracic and lumbar vertebrae, and the wings of the sacrum), dorsal root ganglia of cattle 30 months of age and older, tonsils, and distal ileum of the small intestine of all cattle.
Canadian inspection officials adequately implemented FSIS’ rules regarding BSE and specified risk materials.7
• Serious Concerns Continue in 2005. In May 2005, FSIS initiated a more thorough examination of the Canadian inspection system. FSIS visited 35 establishments, which included 3 meat slaughter establishments, 21 meat and poultry processing establishments, and 11 meat and poultry establishments that had both slaughter and processing operations. FSIS also evaluated operations for residue and microbiological testing at 12 laboratories. The review was completed in June 2005, and FSIS officials continued to find a number of deficiencies that call into question the equivalence of the Canadian inspection system. As in 2003, the deficiencies included the insufficient implementation of sanitation controls and HACCP requirements by establishments and the lack of enforcement in these areas by Canadian inspection officials. FSIS officials noted, but did not report, less than daily inspection at 17 processing establishments.
- In 21 of the 35 establishments, FSIS officials found that the Canadian inspection system did not have adequate sanitation controls. FSIS continued to find that Canadian establishments did not ensure sanitation controls were adequately implemented or evaluated for effectiveness. In addition, the establishments did not take corrective actions when sanitation controls failed to prevent direct product contamination or adulteration and did not maintain daily records of these activities.
- FSIS officials found that Canadian inspection officials did not implement certain HACCP requirements in 19 of the 35 establishments. FSIS again found that Canadian establishments were deficient in validating their HACCP plans, documenting corrective actions, and reassessing the adequacy of the plans.
- As part of the review of specific establishments, FSIS again evaluated whether Canadian inspection officials adequately enforced FSIS requirements. FSIS officials found that the Canadian inspection system did not have adequate controls to ensure FSIS requirements were enforced. FSIS officials identified deficiencies in the areas of sanitation controls and HACCP requirements that had not been previously noted by Canadian inspection officials. This condition occurred in 29 of the 35 establishments visited by FSIS officials.
USDA/OIG-Audit No. 24601-05-Hy Page 9
In 2003, FSIS identified concerns which caused the agency to question the equivalence of the Canadian inspection system and to express concern about U.S. public health. The same types of concerns were identified in the review completed in June 2005. FSIS should analyze the deficiencies identified in the 2003 and 2005 reviews to determine whether immediate actions are needed to address concerns regarding public health and if additional enforcement measures are needed.
• Less Than Daily Inspection in Processing Establishments. ...
question please, i do no understand the part that ;
This review found that
USDA/OIG-Audit No. 24601-05-Hy Page 8
>>> Canadian inspection officials adequately implemented FSIS’ rules regarding BSE and specified risk materials.7<<<
Cc: firstname.lastname@example.org; Linda.Grassie@fda.gov; BSE-L
Subject: Docket No. 2003N-0312 Animal Feed Safety System [TSS SUBMISSION TO DOCKET 2003N-0312]
Greetings FDA, my name is Terry S. Singeltary Sr., i lost my mother to hvCJD (Heidenhain Variant Creutzfeldt Jakob Disease). i would kindly like to comment on the proposed HACCP method of detecting and or preventing TSEs in the human/animal feed supply. it seems to me by implementing something that was designed for Astronauts instead of cattle, something that the GAO has already stated is terribly flawed (HACCP), i find it very disturbing to continue to insist on refusing to use rapid TSE TESTING in sufficient numbers to find TSEs, as with other Countries that they too once thought they were BSE free. for example, it took Italy 1 MILLION rapid TSE tests since 2001 to find 102 cases of BSE. THE USA has only tested 48,000 cattle in the 14 years of surveillance. there is documented proof that indeed the USA cattle have been infected with a TSE for decades, but the FDA/USDA and other USA Gov. agencies continue to conveniently ignore these findings. YOU must not ignore what Richard Marsh found. Plus, you must not ignore Asante/Collinge new findings that BSE transmission to the 129-methionine genotype can lead to an alternate phenotype that is indistinguishable from type 2 PrPSc, the commonest _sporadic_ CJD. The USA has been feeding ruminant by-products back to cattle, deer, elk and sheep for decades, and TSEs in these species have been recycled for feed for decades in the USA. The rendering process here in the USA will not kill this agent. to implement any HACCP over massive rapid TSE testing is only prolonging the inevitable, and will only allow the agent to spread further. it is simply a band-aid approach to something that needs a tourniquet... 3. Meat and Poultry: Better USDA Oversight and Enforcement of Safety Rules Needed to Reduce Risk of Foodborne Illnesses. GAO-02-902, August 30. FSIS Is Not Ensuring that Plants' HACCP Plans Meet Regulatory Requirements
According to FSIS's food safety systems correlation reviews, inspectors are not consistently identifying and documenting failures of plants' HACCP plans to meet regulatory requirements. Furthermore, FSIS does not expect its inspectors to determine whether HACCP plans are based on sound science--the cornerstone of an effective plan. While in-depth verification reviews examine the scientific aspects of HACCP plans, they have been conducted in very few plants, and consumer safety officers hired to review the scientific soundness of HACCP plans may take several years to assess the plans at all plants. Moreover, inspectors in 55 percent of the 5,000 plants nationwide did not document any HACCP violations during fiscal year 2001. When we brought this information to the attention of FSIS officials, they were surprised that so many plants had no HACCP violations for an entire year.
2. USDA believes that the title of the report is misleading. We disagree. We believe the title accurately reflects the concerns detailed throughout the body of the report.
FDA acknowledges that it has not yet identified and inspected all firms subject to the ban” pg. 3 ;
The report concludes that “federal actions do not sufficiently ensure that all BSE-infected animals or products are kept out or that if BSE were found it would be detected promptly and not spread to other cattle through animal feed or enter the human food chain” italics added pg. 3 ;
and why does everybody conveniently ignore these findings;
Asante/Collinge et al, that BSE transmission to the 129-methionine genotype can lead to an alternate phenotype that is indistinguishable from type 2 PrPSc, the commonest _sporadic_ CJD;
To be published in the Proceedings of the Fourth International Scientific Congress in Fur Animal Production. Toronto, Canada, August 21-28, 1988
Evidence That Transmissible Mink Encephalopathy Results from Feeding Infected Cattle
R.F. Marsh* and G.R. Hartsough •Department of Veterinary Science, University of Wisconsin-Madison, Madison, Wisconsin 53706; and ^Emba/Creat Lakes Ranch Service, Thiensville, Wisconsin 53092
Epidemiologic investigation of a new incidence of transmissible mink encephalopathy (TME) in Stetsonville, Wisconsin suggests that the disease may have resulted from feeding infected cattle to mink. This observation is supported by the transmission of a TME-like disease to experimentally inoculated cattle, and by the recent report of a new bovine spongiform encephalopathy in England. INTRODUCTION ....snip...end...TSS
NSLP USDA CERTIFIED DEAD STOCK DOWNER COW SCHOOL LUNCH PROGRAM
>>>Question #1: How many kids have died from a pathogen outbreak involving ground beef that is dervied from the NSLP? Answer: ZERO<<<
>In the papers, the government alleges the meatpacking plant slaughtered and processed downer cows for nearly four years — from January 2004 to September 2007 — at the average rate of one every six weeks<
Wednesday, December 16, 2009 Congress to Sample School Lunches
Do you actually believe all these schools recalled this meat because of a few cattle being abused,
see list ;
FNS All Regions Affected School Food Authorities By State United States Department of Agriculture Food and Nutrition Service National School Lunch Program March 24, 2008 School Food Authorities Affected by Hallmark/Westland Meat Packing Co. Beef Recall February 2006 - February 2008
IF url does not work above, go to this link to find out if any of your children and their school were part of this recall ;
go to this site ;
left hand corner search ; Hallmark/Westland Meat Packing Co. Beef Recall your should get this ;
1 through 1 of 1 matching documents, best matches first. sort by date 1: Hallmark - Westland SFA Reporting by State - 3-24-2008.xls Lunch Program March 24, 2008 School Food Authorities Affected by Hallmark/Westland Meat Packing Co. Beef Recall February 2006 - February 2008 The U.S. Department of Agriculture ...
PLEASE SEE ALSO ;
Members of The HSUS are also concerned about the meat products provided to their children through the National School Lunch Program. More than 31 million school children receive lunches through the program each school day. To assist states in providing healthful, low-cost or free meals, USDA provides states with various commodities including ground beef. As evidenced by the HallmarkNVestland investigation and recall, the potential for downed animals to make their way into the National School Lunch Program is neither speculative nor hypothetical.
Over the next 8-10 weeks, approximately 40% of all the adult mink on the farm died from TME. snip... The rancher was a ''dead stock'' feeder using mostly (>95%) downer or dead dairy cattle...
PLEASE be aware, for 4 years, the USDA fed our children all across the Nation dead stock downer cows, the most high risk cattle for BSE aka mad cow disease and other dangerous pathogens. who will watch our children for CJD for the next 5+ decades ???
SCHOOL LUNCH PROGRAM FROM DOWNER CATTLE UPDATE
please see full text here ;
Tuesday, November 17, 2009
SEAC EFFECT OF AGE ON THE PATHOGENESIS OF TRANSMISSIBLE SPONGIFORM ENCEPHALOPATHIES SEAC 103/2
Saturday, January 2, 2010
Human Prion Diseases in the United States January 1, 2010 ***FINAL***
my comments to PLosone here ;
Friday, February 05, 2010
New Variant Creutzfelt Jakob Disease case reports United States 2010 A Review
Sunday, February 14, 2010
[Docket No. FSIS-2006-0011] FSIS Harvard Risk Assessment of Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE)
Wednesday, February 24, 2010
Transmissible Spongiform encephalopathy (TSE) animal and human TSE in North America
14th ICID International Scientific Exchange Brochure -
14th ICID International Scientific Exchange Brochure -
Final Abstract Number: ISE.114
Session: International Scientific Exchange
Transmissible Spongiform encephalopathy (TSE) animal and human TSE in North America
update October 2009
Bacliff, TX, USA
An update on atypical BSE and other TSE in North America. Please remember, the typical U.K. c-BSE, the atypical l-BSE (BASE), and h-BSE have all been documented in North America, along with the typical scrapie's, and atypical Nor-98 Scrapie, and to date, 2 different strains of CWD, and also TME. All these TSE in different species have been rendered and fed to food producing animals for humans and animals in North America (TSE in cats and dogs ?), and that the trading of these TSEs via animals and products via the USA and Canada has been immense over the years, decades.
12 years independent research of available data
I propose that the current diagnostic criteria for human TSEs only enhances and helps the spreading of human TSE from the continued belief of the UKBSEnvCJD only theory in 2009. With all the science to date refuting it, to continue to validate this old myth, will only spread this TSE agent through a multitude of potential routes and sources i.e. consumption, medical i.e., surgical, blood, dental, endoscopy, optical, nutritional supplements, cosmetics etc.
I would like to submit a review of past CJD surveillance in the USA, and the urgent need to make all human TSE in the USA a reportable disease, in every state, of every age group, and to make this mandatory immediately without further delay. The ramifications of not doing so will only allow this agent to spread further in the medical, dental, surgical arena's. Restricting the reporting of CJD and or any human TSE is NOT scientific. Iatrogenic CJD knows NO age group, TSE knows no boundaries. I propose as with Aguzzi, Asante, Collinge, Caughey, Deslys, Dormont, Gibbs, Gajdusek, Ironside, Manuelidis, Marsh, et al and many more, that the world of TSE Transmissible Spongiform Encephalopathy is far from an exact science, but there is enough proven science to date that this myth should be put to rest once and for all, and that we move forward with a new classification for human and animal TSE that would properly identify the infected species, the source species, and then the route.
International Society for Infectious Diseases Web: http://www.isid.org/
Transmissible Spongiform Encephalopathy